To be honestly I didn’t even know they had aggregated pools, but I will 100% look into it. Where did you find the aggregared swao on the main exchange page?

We operate with two pools of addresses for BTC deposits and transfers - mixed and aggregated. In a mixed pool all received and sent transactions are mixed together and there is no way to discover how many people are behind certain addresses and traceability is extremely difficult, which is very good for privacy but bad for risk scoring. In the aggregated pool all transactions we receive from users are collected on a known single address which is also used to send payments, what will clearly show you have interacted with our exchange and it’s good for interacting with other major exchanges to avoid any risks of frozen funds.

These are cons and pros of each pool:

Aggregated pool (bc1qu2dq8w8lv8v3l7lr2c5tvx3yltv22r3nhkx7w0)

Pros:

No risks of being frozen at major exchanges due to low risk score given by chain analysis platform

Chain analysis platforms will know you have interacted with an exchange and won’t increase a risk score of your sending addresses

Can be useful when someone asks you for a source of funds

Cons:

Reduced privacy

I had X,XXX eaten by a swap before so now I only use BXYZ to XMR. I wish I knew about this for some trades. Wonder if it’s limited to pseudononymous currencies. wish I knew where to find it and more info.

All options I see are flat rate and dynamic rate. Maybe you have to contact them about it.

Not sure about anonexch. Exch.cx is great for whatever to XMR. 5% fee though. Do NOT use them to trade XMR to a pseudononymous crypto like BTC at anywhere that checks KYC or availability of dirty address (Trocador hsd a checjer on their site fwiw) as there’s like an 85% chance you’ll have to do KYC and explain to get it back.Unless you’re using Trocador and are at or under their guarantee, then they will just send the funds back to the original address, no questions asked, provided you have access to it.

I dunno. They started out with different owners. It’s still fully manual (buy prepaid visa, get it in 24 hours, maybe.)

They once advertised cards that would not be detected as prepaid. Surprise, company I bought it for wouldn’t accept a prepaid card, no refund just “sorry for luck maybe try another site?”

Edit I had allark and majesticbank confused.

Yes, but setting the environment variables before running setup. The following two coded env vars will set your btcpay server to automatically also run a tor hidden service. Once XMR is configured (only one wallet per server at the moment) you should be able to access the hidden service and pay without issue.

Run btcpay-setup.sh with the right parameters

Set the custom domain you chose to use

export BTCPAY_HOST=“btcpay.EXAMPLE.com”

Use Bitcoin on mainnet

export NBITCOIN_NETWORK=“mainnet”

Enable Bitcoin support

export BTCPAYGEN_CRYPTO1=“btc”

Enable Monero support

export BTCPAYGEN_CRYPTO2="xmr"

opt-add-tor enables Tor support for the UI and Bitcoin node

export BTCPAYGEN_ADDITIONAL_FRAGMENTS="opt-save-storage-xs;opt-add-tor" 

Survivor bias and and an ad all in one post!

When I see posts like this it gets my glowie senses tingling.

You may not like it, but this is what peak machine learning performance with 4chan training data looks like.

In the guide you linked, the docker container automatically sets up a hidden service. You don’t need to do anything beyond firewall rules if it’s not working for you.

Thank you for answering my questions. Having much more knowledge in this area, what is your gut feeling about it being not random spam DDoS, but a way to get some type of sensitive data, that can make identifying users easier? Happy to receive a PM and won’t share.

I just noticed your username. Thank you for the project, Feather is amazing. I have a question though. I know Ruckinum ran an analysis and thinks this is not a black marble flood, but I can’t help but think it’s a way go somehow break the anonymity of monero, whether just sent amounts, or received amounts, which would still give a wealth of information.

I don’t believe this is a random (D)DoS/spam. This is a deanon attack. I know it in my gut. I don’t know enough about the internals of monero but I think you might.

Specifically…

The bug was triggered when the number of RingCT outputs on the blockchain exceeded 100 million

For instance, this transaction was constructed using a manipulated output distribution. Can you determine what the true spend is? Notice that all ring members are older than 1y 200d except for one 6-day-old output. Unless the user checks the ring on a block explorer and knows what to look out for, they would not notice that their transactions are being fingerprinted.

My understanding is that the 16 (or 15+real?) rings are all real, prior transactions. Are the transactions reused? If not, then they exhaust the supply of rings and now have great statistical advantage going forward. If they are reused, then they can tell the real spend by discarding any spend that’s been used more than once. Is that correct?

I can’t help but believe this is part of something larger, along with all the previous attacks in the last 2 years and now Samourai, Liquid pulling out of US, attacks on tor, RISAA and mandatory KYC on US cloud providers and domain registrars…

On that note, we’ve known LE has tools for years now (Chainalysis and 1-2 others) that can in some circumstances give a lead on who a target is, likely via statistical analysis. The tools are only available to law enforcement so the methods aren’t known. My thoughts are, in no particular order:

1. They run or have compromised a lot of ‘activist’ nodes and xpubs are sent to the nodes in light wallets, unsure if this is how it works, or if that was unique to Samourai’s whirlpool design. If this was the case, light wallets use currently online available servers, so chances are a user connects their wallet to tens of servers. Users who run their own nodes would be unaffected but I think the majority of monero users use light nodes.

2. They have tools that monitor public ledger chains, and watch the amounts in/out. You use an exchange service to trade $500 of BTC to XMR, the amounts (fees included) are correlated over time, leading to known persons selling via KYC services. Probably least likely option but unsure how XMR works in depth.

3. They run and/or work with (gag order) no-KYC major services that would have that information, as well as other more ‘centralized’ helpful no-KYC exchange services that know exactly what amount and address the funds are going to and where they came from.

deleted by creator

Oops I was wrong, it looks like I have a penny left in the sending wallet so it was just a lucky coincidence on amounts sent during testing.

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When gold was used as currency, it would be shaved off using a scale to confirm the weight (gold is a very soft metal, easily ‘sliced’ off the coin/bar. Shopkeepers had their own scales but wary customers could carry gold pocket scales to confirm the weight.

Just like you can spend fractions of a cryptocoin, you can spend fractions of a precious metal coin.

XMR PRICE

(2/4/24) $165

(4/13/24) $115

That’s a 30% decrease in about 2 months. As an aside, 30% is the APR for most high-interest loans.

The idea is there, but something like DAI would be better to look at, although it remains to be seen how long crypto will be used and accessible (especially once CBDC rolls out and legislators getting even more heavy-handed with non-CBDC coins.)

The only way this would work is to peg it to fiat or commodity. Or expect that your ROI will either be nothing or an insane amount.

FTA:

The key thing to note is that no observer can link two addresses together. However, it is possible for the sender to link payments together if the receiver re-uses addresses.

For example, if you withdraw from ExchangeA using AddressA, and then go on to issue another withdrawal from ExchangeA using AddressA, the exchange will easily be able to link these two withdrawals together by simply comparing the withdrawal addresses (even if you used different accounts). Furthermore, if ExchangeA is cooperating with ExchangeB, it would be possible for both exchanges to link address-reusing withdrawals together.

Additionally, even if the sender is not cooperating with other entities in order to link transactions together, it is still possible for the sender to unwittingly link transactions together if their software is poorly implemented and erroneously re-uses the same random data for multiple transactions. Basically, the receiver is relying on the sender to generate good random data in order to generate a one-time key. If the sender fails to use good random data, then the “one-time” key isn’t “one-time”, and transactions can possibly be linked.

So, for maximum protection against linkability, it’s a good idea to generate a new addresses for transactions that you don’t want linked.

Further reading: https://localmonero.co/knowledge/monero-subaddresses?language=en

I think this can easily be achieved by generating a new subaddress for every request. ( I don’t know how OpenAlias works, maybe it already does this.)

Question. Does this somehow generate a new subaddress for every request? I ask because address reuse is dangerous for the privacy of monero. While most people don’t know this, I assume you do.

Just don’t run an exit node? We need more guard and relay nodes anyway. I fail to see the issue.

Chances are this is a kid or NEET and all his friend wants is a super simple website with basic info for his local business. Dad is either doing him a favor, or giving him some pocket change so he’ll stop bothering him for money for a month. This is what happens when you don’t teach your children to be adults, and give them everything instead. Seen it too many times.

Based on this interaction alone and his dad deciding the price for him, I’m going to make the wildly assumptious assumption this is a 20s/30s(/40s?) unemploymed guy living at his dad’s house rent free.

If my assumptions are incorrect, sorry mate, you did not win the dad lottery.